The law of the unintentional killer appears in several places in the Torah: at length at the end of Numbers (35:9–34); in Deuteronomy’s account of the refuge cities Moses set aside east of the Jordan (4:41–43) and the command to set aside further cities (19:1–13); and briefly in Exodus (21:12–13).
An intriguing law appearing only in Numbers requires the unintentional killer to remain in a city of refuge until the high priest’s death. Why must he stay even after his killing is found to have been unintentional, and why may he return home after the high priest dies?
The City of Refuge as Punishment
Some commentators regard residence in the refuge city as punishment. This is common in rabbinic interpretation, which sees it as exile. For example:
The rabbis said: what is this like? A craftsman making an image of the king broke it in his hands. The king said: had he broken it intentionally, he would be killed; since he broke it unintentionally, he shall be banished to another place. Likewise, the Holy One decreed, “Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed” (Genesis 9:6). But whoever kills unintentionally is exiled from his place, as it says that he shall flee to one of these cities and live (Deuteronomy 4:42). (Deuteronomy Rabbah 2:30)
This still does not explain the connection between exile and the high priest, particularly his death. Why does punishment last precisely until that event?
A Sifrei midrash quoted by Rashi says that the high priest “comes to cause the divine presence to dwell in Israel and prolong their days, while the killer comes to remove the divine presence and shorten lives; he is not worthy to be before the high priest” (Rashi, Numbers 35:25). Even an unintentional killer is thus the opposite of the high priest. He is punished by exclusion from the high priest’s presence and residence in distant exile.
Although this explains a connection, why does punishment end with the high priest’s death? Another high priest replaces him, in whose presence the killer should apparently be equally unworthy.
Another problem is the variability of this punishment. A high priest may die soon and the killer return home immediately, or may live many years, perhaps outliving the killer, who would then remain until his own death. Such a sentence is implausible: identical offenses ordinarily receive identical penalties.
Obadiah Sforno recognizes this and suggests the unequal duration allows different punishment for different degrees of inadvertence:
Unintentional acts are not equal: some approach compulsion and some intentional wrongdoing. Exile was therefore assigned an unequal duration. Some offenses occur shortly before the priest’s death; in other cases the killer dies in exile before the priest. This is by God’s judgment, for He knows and witnesses, punishing according to the degree of inadvertence, as it says that God caused it to come to his hand (Exodus 21:13). (Sforno, Numbers 35:25)
But this is not convincing. Several unintentional killings would very probably occur during one high priest’s lifetime. If God determines his death to fit one killer’s degree of responsibility, why should he die immediately because of someone only slightly culpable? Nor is it clear how God could arrange every killing at the appropriate interval before the priest’s death according to its gravity.
Another original explanation treats the sentence as deliberately random, measure for measure. The killer claims the death happened accidentally, beyond his control. The Torah rejects this escape from responsibility and gives an arbitrary sentence with a chance duration: until the high priest dies. Yet this is unconvincing too, since choosing this particular event presumably gives it significance rather than arbitrariness.
A second midrash in Rashi also treats the residence as punishment, but for the high priest: “He should have prayed that this mishap not occur to Israel during his lifetime” (Numbers 35:25). The Torah thus hints that the killer’s stay will be relatively short, ending in the priest’s death as punishment for failing to pray against unintentional killing. Targum Jonathan similarly explains:
He shall remain there until the high priest dies … Because he did not pray on the Day of Atonement in the Holy of Holies that the house of Israel not stumble in three grave transgressions – foreign worship, forbidden sexual relations, and the shedding of innocent blood – although his prayer could have prevented them, he is sentenced to die in that year. (Targum Jonathan, Numbers 35:25; translated from the quoted Aramaic.)
In a free rendering, the priest’s failure to pray against these three sins brings death upon him that year. But this does not fit the plain text, which never states its central claim: that the high priest sinned.
Atonement for the Unintentional Killer
A common scholarly explanation sees the high priest’s death as atoning for unintentional homicide, allowing the killer to return. Samuel David Luzzatto writes:
The priest atones for unintentional offenses through the sacrifices he offers, and the high priest even more, since he is commanded to serve on the Day of Atonement. The high priest’s death is an unsurpassed atonement, atoning for unintentional killing, which is graver than all other unintentional offenses. (Luzzatto, Numbers 35:25)
Although initially plausible, this has several difficulties. Rabbinic literature does contain the idea that a righteous person’s natural death atones:
Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said: Aaron’s sons died on the first of Nisan; why mention their death on the Day of Atonement? To teach that just as the Day of Atonement atones, so does the death of the righteous. (Tanhuma, Buber edition, Aharei Mot 10)
The Torah contains a related idea: executing the murderer and shedding his blood is the only atonement for bloodshed:
So ye shall not pollute the land wherein ye are; for blood, it polluteth the land; and no expiation can be made for the land for the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it. (Numbers 35:33)
וְלָאָרֶץ לֹא יְכֻפַּר לַדָּם אֲשֶׁר שֻׁפַּךְ בָּהּ כִּי אִם בְּדַם שֹׁפְכוֹ. (במדבר ל"ה לג)
But neither the Torah nor the rest of Scripture presents a person’s natural death as atonement. If this is the intention of requiring refuge until the high priest dies, it is an innovation we would expect to be stated explicitly, perhaps: “He shall dwell there until the high priest’s death, and his unintentional offense shall be atoned for.” This is a suggested formulation, not a biblical verse.
Moreover, this explanation assumes that unintentional killing needs atonement. That seems obvious: people are responsible for their actions, and someone’s omission or negligence ultimately caused an Israelite’s death. This presumably guided the sages. Yet the verses do not portray it that way. Exodus describes it as follows:
He that smiteth a man, so that he dieth, shall surely be put to death. And if a man lie not in wait, but God cause it to come to hand; then I will appoint thee a place whither he may flee. (Exodus 21:12–13)
מַכֵּה אִישׁ וָמֵת מוֹת יוּמָת. וַאֲשֶׁר לֹא צָדָה וְהָאֱלֹהִים אִנָּה לְיָדוֹ וְשַׂמְתִּי לְךָ מָקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יָנוּס שָׁמָּה. (שמות כ"א יב-יג)
The famous midrash quoted by Rashi on “God cause it to come to hand” describes God bringing together at one inn an intentional murderer and an unintentional killer whose earlier acts had no witnesses. The latter stands above the former and accidentally kills him, this time before witnesses. Justice results: the murderer is killed and the unintentional killer exiled (Yalkut Shimoni, 1 Samuel 24, section 133). But this beautiful midrash does not fit the plain meaning. Exodus refers to someone acting without intention, serving as an instrument of God’s will and therefore not responsible for the outcome. The sages’ idea that God arranged the event to punish the dead person is plausible, but the text gives no hint of an offense by the unintentional killer or a need for punishment or atonement.
Similarly, Deuteronomy and Numbers describe the killer as unaware of the action, without mentioning responsibility. Deuteronomy says he kills “unawares” (בִּבְלִי דַעַת; 19:4). Its example distances him from the action: the iron slips from the handle and strikes his fellow, who dies (19:5). The iron falls by itself and happens to find the other man. Numbers describes killing “seeing him not” (בְּלֹא רְאוֹת; 35:23). The sages’ ruling that the killer bears responsibility because he should have prevented such circumstances is not even hinted at in the Torah.
The Torah does require atoning sacrifices for inadvertent offenses, even through lack of knowledge: the priest atones for an error committed without knowing it (Leviticus 5:18). But there the ignorance concerns the law or circumstances creating the prohibition, not awareness of one’s act. The preceding verse speaks of someone doing a prohibited act without knowing and bearing guilt (5:17).
Throughout these descriptions, the killer acted “unawares,” “seeing him not,” and the tragedy happened because “God cause it to come to hand,” by divine decree outside his control. None mentions responsibility, punishment, or atonement for this killer. The requirement that bloodshed be atoned for only by the blood of its shedder (Numbers 35:33) refers solely to intentional murder, not an accidental killer whose blood must not be shed.
Nor do the verses support exile as punishment; quite the reverse. The refuge cities were important, central places, not remote towns or isolated islands for banishment. In Canaan they included Shechem and Hebron. Hebron was Judah’s capital, where David ruled before Jerusalem. Shechem was an important Israelite city where Rehoboam was appointed king and which briefly served as Jeroboam’s capital. These are hardly distant places of exile. Their centrality also challenges exclusion from the high priest’s presence: why would living there count as outside his presence more than elsewhere?
If flight is punitive exile, why does the Torah not explicitly identify a sin requiring atonement? If exile alone is the punishment, why may the blood avenger kill before the fugitive reaches refuge? How can the prescribed exile lead to death? Why should a slow runner die while a swift one escapes?
The Blood Avenger
Perhaps the answer lies in the procedure following a killing. Unlike modern states, the Torah presents a dispute between killer and blood avenger, with the congregation as arbitrator. The congregation does not prosecute but judges between them (Numbers 35:24). The plaintiff is the avenger, not the state or society. In intentional murder, the avenger executes the murderer (35:18–19).
After an unintentional killing, the killer flees to refuge, then faces trial against the avenger. If the killing was intentional, he is handed over for execution. If unintentional, the congregation returns him to refuge:
and the congregation shall deliver the manslayer out of the hand of the avenger of blood, and the congregation shall restore him to his city of refuge, whither he was fled; and he shall dwell therein until the death of the high priest, who was anointed with the holy oil. (Numbers 35:25)
וְהִצִּילוּ הָעֵדָה אֶת הָרֹצֵחַ מִיַּד גֹּאֵל הַדָּם וְהֵשִׁיבוּ אֹתוֹ הָעֵדָה אֶל עִיר מִקְלָטוֹ אֲשֶׁר נָס שָׁמָּה וְיָשַׁב בָּהּ עַד מוֹת הַכֹּהֵן הַגָּדֹל אֲשֶׁר מָשַׁח אֹתוֹ בְּשֶׁמֶן הַקֹּדֶשׁ. (במדבר ל"ה כה)
Notice “the congregation shall deliver the manslayer out of the hand of the avenger of blood.” Refuge as the means of rescue is surprising. If acquitted, why does he need protection? Immediately after the killing the avenger’s anger might lead him to retaliate without awaiting trial, as Deuteronomy says:
lest the avenger of blood pursue the manslayer, while his heart is hot, and overtake him, because the way is long, and smite him mortally; whereas he was not deserving of death, inasmuch as he hated him not in time past. (Deuteronomy 19:6)
פֶּן יִרְדֹּף גֹּאֵל הַדָּם אַחֲרֵי הָרֹצֵחַ כִּי יֵחַם לְבָבוֹ וְהִשִּׂיגוֹ כִּי יִרְבֶּה הַדֶּרֶךְ וְהִכָּהוּ נָפֶשׁ וְלוֹ אֵין מִשְׁפַּט מָוֶת כִּי לֹא שֹׂנֵא הוּא לוֹ מִתְּמוֹל שִׁלְשׁוֹם. (דברים י"ט ו)
But after trial and acquittal, why protect him rather than forbid the avenger to kill? That is precisely what happens when he returns home after the high priest dies: the avenger must accept the judgment and may not harm him. Why may he be killed for leaving refuge when he does not deserve death?
In the Guide of the Perplexed, Maimonides explains that sacrifices were a compromise suited to an age when worship consisted of offering animals in image-filled temples, bowing to those images, and burning incense. Abolishing this outright was inconceivable given human attachment to accustomed practices. It would be like a modern prophet saying, “God has commanded you not to pray, fast, or cry out in distress; worship shall be thought alone, with no action.” (III:32, Schwartz edition; translated from the quoted Hebrew.) The Torah’s treatment of blood vengeance can be understood similarly.
For millennia before the Torah, blood vengeance was a useful social mechanism, ensuring great caution against killing, even accidentally. The avenger’s central role suggests that, as with sacrifices, the Torah recognizes this institution, perhaps out of necessity, and the avenger’s right to kill in any case, including accidental homicide.
On the other hand, the Torah holds that an unintentional killer does not deserve death. To reconcile the principles, it accepts the avenger’s retaliation while protecting someone claiming innocence, and someone judged an accidental killer, through refuge cities. In principle it adopts the ancient right to avenge even accidental killing. Inside refuge, however, the congregation’s protection prevents the avenger from killing him. Outside its boundary, he loses that protection and bears the consequence.
The statement that there is no bloodguilt when the killer is outside refuge does not necessarily imply bloodguilt inside. Compare the burglar law (Exodus 22:1–2), which explicitly states both possibilities: no bloodguilt at night, bloodguilt by day. Here the Torah addresses only killing outside refuge, probably because the inhabitants’ protection makes killing inside rare. In principle, should that happen, it too would be a legitimate act of blood vengeance.
The killer remains until the high priest’s death and then returns home without fear. Why does the need for protection end then?
The Judicial System
The answer lies in the judicial system. Exodus describes the arrangement Jethro proposed and Moses implemented: chiefs of thousands, hundreds, fifties, and tens, with Moses at the top receiving difficult cases. More than ten percent of the public are judges, an enormous system matching a military hierarchy from ten-person squads to battalions. This operated in the wilderness, but the land of Israel had a different judicial model.
Deuteronomy begins Parashat Shoftim by requiring judges and officers in every town (16:18). It does not identify them there, but does so in the law of the rebellious elder:
If there arise a matter too hard for thee in judgment, between blood and blood, between plea and plea, and between stroke and stroke, even matters of controversy within thy gates; then shalt thou arise, and get thee up unto the place which the LORD thy God shall choose. And thou shall come unto the priests the Levites, and unto the judge that shall be in those days; and thou shalt inquire; and they shall declare unto thee the sentence of judgment. And thou shalt do according to the tenor of the sentence, which they shall declare unto thee from that place which the LORD shall choose; and thou shalt observe to do according to all that they shall teach thee. According to the law which they shall teach thee, and according to the judgment which they shall tell thee, thou shalt do; thou shalt not turn aside from the sentence which they shall declare unto thee, to the right hand, nor to the left. And the man that doeth presumptuously, in not hearkening unto the priest that standeth to minister there before the LORD thy God, or unto the judge, even that man shall die; and thou shalt exterminate the evil from Israel. And all the people shall hear, and fear, and do no more presumptuously. (Deuteronomy 17:8–13)
כִּי יִפָּלֵא מִמְּךָ דָבָר לַמִּשְׁפָּט בֵּין דָּם לְדָם בֵּין דִּין לְדִין וּבֵין נֶגַע לָנֶגַע דִּבְרֵי רִיבֹת בִּשְׁעָרֶיךָ: וְקַמְתָּ וְעָלִיתָ אֶל הַמָּקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ בּוֹ. ובָאתָ אֶל הַכֹּהֲנִים הַלְוִיִּם וְאֶל הַשֹּׁפֵט אֲשֶׁר יִהְיֶה בַּיָּמִים הָהֵם וְדָרַשְׁתָּ וְהִגִּידוּ לְךָ אֵת דְּבַר הַמִּשְׁפָּט. וְעָשִׂיתָ עַל פִּי הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר יַגִּידוּ לְךָ מִן הַמָּקוֹם הַהוּא אֲשֶׁר יִבְחַר ה' וְשָׁמַרְתָּ לַעֲשׂוֹת כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר יוֹרוּךָ. עַל פִּי הַתּוֹרָה אֲשֶׁר יוֹרוּךָ וְעַל הַמִּשְׁפָּט אֲשֶׁר יֹאמְרוּ לְךָ תַּעֲשֶׂה: לֹא תָסוּר מִן הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר יַגִּידוּ לְךָ יָמִין וּשְׂמֹאל. וְהָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר יַעֲשֶׂה בְזָדוֹן לְבִלְתִּי שְׁמֹעַ אֶל הַכֹּהֵן הָעֹמֵד לְשָׁרֶת שָׁם אֶת ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ אוֹ אֶל הַשֹּׁפֵט וּמֵת הָאִישׁ הַהוּא וּבִעַרְתָּ הָרָע מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל. וְכָל הָעָם יִשְׁמְעוּ וְיִרָאוּ וְלֹא יְזִידוּן עוֹד. (דברים י"ז, ח-יג)
Later, regarding false witnesses:
then both the men, between whom the controversy is, shall stand before the LORD, before the priests and the judges that shall be in those days. (Deuteronomy 19:17)
וְעָמְדוּ שְׁנֵי הָאֲנָשִׁים אֲשֶׁר לָהֶם הָרִיב לִפְנֵי ה' לִפְנֵי הַכֹּהֲנִים וְהַשֹּׁפְטִים אֲשֶׁר יִהְיוּ בַּיָּמִים הָהֵם. (דברים י"ט יז)
And regarding the heifer whose neck is broken:
And the priests the sons of Levi shall come near–for them the LORD thy God hath chosen to minister unto Him, and to bless in the name of the LORD; and according to their word shall every controversy and every stroke be. (Deuteronomy 21:5)
וְנִגְּשׁוּ הַכֹּהֲנִים בְּנֵי לֵוִי כִּי בָם בָּחַר ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ לְשָׁרְתוֹ וּלְבָרֵךְ בְּשֵׁם ה' וְעַל פִּיהֶם יִהְיֶה כָּל רִיב וְכָל נָגַע. (דברים כ"א ה)
These verses entrust justice to the Levitical priests. We may therefore assume that the high priest, heading priests and Levites, headed the judiciary. Evidence appears in 2 Chronicles’ description of Jehoshaphat’s system in Jerusalem and Judah, resembling Deuteronomy in language and structure: judges and officers from priests and Levites in the cities, disputes, and distinctions between blood, law, and injury.
And Jehoshaphat dwelt at Jerusalem; and he went out again among the people from Beer-sheba to the hill-country of Ephraim, and brought them back unto the LORD, the God of their fathers. And he set judges in the land throughout all the fortified cities of Judah, city by city, and said to the judges: ‘Consider what ye do; for ye judge not for man, but for the LORD; and [He is] with you in giving judgment. Now therefore let the fear of the LORD be upon you; take heed and do it; for there is no iniquity with the LORD our God, nor respect of persons, nor taking of bribes.’ Moreover in Jerusalem did Jehoshaphat set of the Levites and the priests, and of the heads of the fathers’houses of Israel, for the judgment of the LORD, and for controversies. And they returned to Jerusalem. And he charged them, saying: ‘Thus shall ye do in the fear of the LORD, faithfully, and with a whole heart. And whensoever any controversy shall come to you from your brethren that dwell in their cities, between blood and blood, between law and commandment, statutes and ordinances, ye shall warn them, that they be not guilty towards the LORD, and so wrath come upon you and upon your brethren; thus shall ye do, and ye shall not be guilty. And, behold, Amariah the chief priest is over you in all matters of the LORD; and Zebadiah the son of Ishmael, the ruler of the house of Judah, in all the king’s matters; also the officers of the Levites before you. Deal courageously, and the LORD be with the good.’ (2 Chronicles 19:4–11)
וַיֵּשֶׁב יְהוֹשָׁפָט בִּירוּשָׁלִָם... וַיַּעֲמֵד שֹׁפְטִים בָּאָרֶץ בְּכָל עָרֵי יְהוּדָה הַבְּצֻרוֹת לְעִיר וָעִיר. וַיֹּאמֶר אֶל הַשֹּׁפְטִים רְאוּ מָה אַתֶּם עֹשִׂים כִּי לֹא לְאָדָם תִּשְׁפְּטוּ כִּי לַה' וְעִמָּכֶם בִּדְבַר מִשְׁפָּט. וְעַתָּה יְהִי פַחַד ה' עֲלֵיכֶם שִׁמְרוּ וַעֲשׂוּ כִּי אֵין עִם ה' אֱלֹהֵינוּ עַוְלָה וּמַשֹּׂא פָנִים וּמִקַּח שֹׁחַד. וְגַם בִּירוּשָׁלִַם הֶעֱמִיד יְהוֹשָׁפָט מִן הַלְוִיִּם וְהַכֹּהֲנִים וּמֵרָאשֵׁי הָאָבוֹת לְיִשְׂרָאֵל לְמִשְׁפַּט ה' וְלָרִיב וַיָּשֻׁבוּ יְרוּשָׁלִָם. וַיְצַו עֲלֵיהֶם לֵאמֹר כֹּה תַעֲשׂוּן בְּיִרְאַת ה' בֶּאֱמוּנָה וּבְלֵבָב שָׁלֵם. וְכָל רִיב אֲשֶׁר יָבוֹא עֲלֵיכֶם מֵאֲחֵיכֶם הַיֹּשְׁבִים בְּעָרֵיהֶם בֵּין דָּם לְדָם בֵּין תּוֹרָה לְמִצְוָה לְחֻקִּים וּלְמִשְׁפָּטִים וְהִזְהַרְתֶּם אֹתָם וְלֹא יֶאְשְׁמוּ לַה' וְהָיָה קֶצֶף עֲלֵיכֶם וְעַל אֲחֵיכֶם כֹּה תַעֲשׂוּן וְלֹא תֶאְשָׁמוּ. וְהִנֵּה אֲמַרְיָהוּ כֹהֵן הָרֹאשׁ עֲלֵיכֶם לְכֹל דְּבַר ה' וּזְבַדְיָהוּ בֶן יִשְׁמָעֵאל הַנָּגִיד לְבֵית יְהוּדָה לְכֹל דְּבַר הַמֶּלֶךְ וְשֹׁטְרִים הַלְוִיִּם לִפְנֵיכֶם חִזְקוּ וַעֲשׂוּ וִיהִי ה' עִם הַטּוֹב. (דברי הימים ב י"ט ד-יא)
The conclusion identifies Amariah the priest as chief, presumably the high priest heading the system.
The death of the high priest, head of the judiciary, ends one period and begins another. The accidental killer can return safely because blood vengeance is not permitted forever but limited to the tenure of the judicial head. In modern terms, the case becomes time-barred after the high priest’s death.
Vengeance is permitted until that death because the killing occurred during the incumbent’s tenure. He allows the victim’s relative to avenge the death within the legitimate framework for a killing in his period. After his death, that period ends. The avenger can no longer kill without himself becoming a murderer. If he does, it will not count as legitimate vengeance or earn the congregation’s protection; he will be tried for murder. The accidental killer may therefore return home, secure because the period of lawful blood vengeance has expired.
