That be far from Thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked, that so the righteous should be as the wicked; that be far from Thee; shall not the judge of all the earth do justly?’ (Genesis 18:25)

חָלִלָה לְּךָ מֵעֲשֹׂת כַּדָּבָר הַזֶּה – לְהָמִית צַדִּיק עִם רָשָׁע, וְהָיָה כַצַּדִּיק כָּרָשָׁע. חָלִלָה לָּךְ, הֲשֹׁפֵט כָּל הָאָרֶץ לֹא יַעֲשֶׂה מִשְׁפָּט?! (בראשית י"ח, כה)

One philosophical proof of God’s existence is the “argument from morality.” Briefly, it runs as follows:

  1. Morality exists in human experience.
  2. God is the best explanation of this moral experience.
  3. Therefore God exists.

The argument rests on the assumption that objective moral truths exist and require God to confer authority upon them.

The biblical text, however, offers a different approach: God is presented as required to uphold morality, rather than as creating it. God acts according to moral principles and enforces them, but the Torah does not present Him as their authority’s source.

Divine judgment’s justice and God’s commitment to morality are tested twice in this parasha: in His discussion with Abraham over Sodom’s fate, and in His dialogue with Abimelech after the latter innocently took Abraham’s wife Sarah.

In both cases, Abraham and Abimelech take uncompromising, even aggressive positions against the possibility that the LORD is not fully committed to justice as humans understand it. Both entertain the possibility that God intends to violate moral and judicial rules and harm the innocent, and try to dissuade Him.

In Abimelech’s case, the LORD appears in a night dream and announces that he will die for taking a married woman. Abimelech does more than defend his innocent action; he opens with an accusation against God containing direct criticism:

Lord, wilt Thou slay even a righteous nation? (Genesis 20:4)

אֲדֹנָי, הֲגוֹי גַּם צַדִּיק תַּהֲרֹג?! (בראשית כ', ד)

Abraham understands that the LORD intends to strike Sodom despite its righteous inhabitants, and begins by absolutely denying such action’s legitimacy:

And Abraham drew near, and said: ‘Will You indeed sweep away the righteous with the wicked? Peradventure there are fifty righteous within the city; wilt Thou indeed sweep away and not forgive the place for the fifty righteous that are therein? That be far from Thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked, that so the righteous should be as the wicked; that be far from Thee; shall not the judge of all the earth do justly?’ (Genesis 18:23–25)

וַיִּגַּשׁ אַבְרָהָם וַיֹּאמַר: הַאַף תִּסְפֶּה צַדִּיק עִם רָשָׁע? אוּלַי יֵשׁ חֲמִשִּׁים צַדִּיקִם בְּתוֹךְ הָעִיר? הַאַף תִּסְפֶּה וְלֹא תִשָּׂא לַמָּקוֹם לְמַעַן חֲמִשִּׁים הַצַּדִּיקִם אֲשֶׁר בְּקִרְבָּהּ? חָלִלָה לְּךָ מֵעֲשֹׂת כַּדָּבָר הַזֶּה – לְהָמִית צַדִּיק עִם רָשָׁע, וְהָיָה כַצַּדִּיק כָּרָשָׁע. חָלִלָה לָּךְ, הֲשֹׁפֵט כָּל הָאָרֶץ לֹא יַעֲשֶׂה מִשְׁפָּט?! (בראשית י"ח, כג-כה)

According to Kant, if an objective moral law exists, it cannot arise from humanity itself but requires an external source; God, on his account, provides the best and even sole explanation.

Yet it is difficult to see morality’s source and sole explanation in the God portrayed in these Genesis stories: Abraham and Abimelech dispute His justice, consider the possibility that He may act unjustly, and seek to prevent it.

Their questions are rhetorical demands that justice’s principles be upheld, rather than inquiries seeking to understand His ways. Addressing Him with moral demands shows that, in their eyes, morality binds Him instead of being determined by Him. They ask Him neither to clarify His ways nor explain their compatibility with justice; they remind Him of His commitment to justice’s laws, to which He is subject no less than humanity.

These stories’ message is that “the way of the LORD” is indeed “to do righteousness and justice” (Genesis 18:19). Yet the obligation to judge justly is not determined by Him. Righteousness and justice are concepts binding upon God that humans properly understand.

This decisively answers Socrates’ question:

Is piety loved [by the gods] because it is piety, or is it piety because it is loved [by the gods]? (Plato, Euthyphro, fourth century BCE)

האם אהובה היא החסידות (על האלים) - מפני שחסידות היא, או מפני שהיא אהובה (על האלים) - על כן היא חסידות? (אֶוּתִיפְרוֹן, אפלטון, המאה ה־4 לפנה״ס).

The Torah assumes that divine commands are subject to morality: God commands the good because it is good and desirable in itself (see also “I Am the LORD”).